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Ours is an era when the relation between a nation's domestic condition and 
its foreign policies has become increasingly close. Japan is no exception. That 
nation's post-1945 leadership, political institutions, and economic policies 
have combined with a cultural legacy, modified but still influential, to 
provide the foundations of contemporary Japanese foreign policy. While 
aspects of that foreign policy are now under intensive review and may 
undergo substantial alterations in the years immediately ahead, such 
development cannot diverge greatly from the indigenous sources that 
provide them with support. 
The Japanese Political System 
What are the salient characteristics of the contemporary Japanese political 
system? Among the major industrial nations, Japan represents a political 
phenomenon. Despite a full range of political rights for the citizenry and an 
uninhibited competitive political party system, power has not been trans- 
ferred via the electoral process in the more than three decades since the 
creation of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). Under conditions of political 
freedom, Japan has maintained the type of dominant party system only 
achieved in most other Asian societies through some degree of political 
restraint. Political stability in turn has enabled a continuity of social and 
economic policy rare in the modem world. 
Many reasons can be advanced for conservative dominance in Japanese 
politics: the special nature of Japanese culture; the capacity to fashion a 
powerful coalition of interest groups; access to ample funds; the unequal 
election districts; the weaknesses of the opposition parties. It remains, how- 
ever, that had not LDP policies been succesful, and particularly the economic 
policies that bore its imprimatur, none of the other factors singly or 
collectively would have sufficed in all likelihood. It is also important to note 
that the special factional composition of the Liberal Democratic Party has 
enabled Japan to change leaders without changing parties. In essence, the 
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LDP is a federation of distinctive groups, each with a recognized leader. 
Coalitions between and among these groups form to choose the party 
president, who then proceeds to become the prime minister. A gentlemen's 
agreement, now buttressed by party regulations, normally prevents any 
given individual from holding these offices too long. Thus, rather than 
risking election with a leader that has expended his political capital, the LDP 
can present the voters with a different face from among the handful of 
political veterans that have awaited their turn for the top office. 
Some observers have challenged the right of Japan to be called a 
democracy, arguing that udess a nation has experienced a transferral of 
power through elections, the democratic system has not been put sufficiently 
to the test. This is a curious argument. If the electorate is given the 
opportunity to choose among competitive parties in reasonably free and fair 
elections and signifies its general satisfaction with those in power, it has 
exercised its basic democratic right. More telling is the thesis that Japan is the 
archetypical bureaucratic polity, with administrative edicts and guidance 
dominating the political process in an authoritarian manner. It is true that 
officialdom has played a powerful role in Japanese governance in liaison with 
LDP leaders, many of whom have themselves come from an earlier 
bureaucratic career. Protected by the historic respect for officials, sheltered 
by a stable parliamentary majority and relying upon the personal network 
that connects individuals across organizational lines, Japan's political leaders, 
it is asserted, have been guided relatively infrequently by public opinion or 
even by private interest groups. 
There is merit in this view, but two points must be immediately advanced. 
First, such groups as the agricultural cooperatives and the industrial feder- 
ations have never been without influence in various branches of the Japanese 
government. Second, as all obsenrers agree, recent years have witnessed the 
relative decline in the power of the bureaucracy, even such important 
agencies as the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), and the 
rise in the power of key interest groups and the professional politicians 
interrelated to them. 
Indeed, for Japan, the process of democratization involves inroads into the 
ramparts of bureaucratic power rather than the extension of popular political 
rights. Whether a stronger public input in policy will result in better or more 
effective policy is a moot question. This is one of the several respects in which 
evolutionary change might lead to greater instability in future Japanese 
politics. Generally speaking, the advent of populist democracy gives rise to 
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more strident demands for early gratification with less attention paid to 
middle-or longer-range considerations. Populist politics may also sharpen 
class consciousness, especially in strongly hierarchical societies. 
Earlier prediction of such developments or of coalition politics in Japan, 
however, have proven to be greatly premature. To be sure, two of the 
moderate opposition parties, the Democratic Socialist and the Komeito 
(Clean Government Party) have moved increasingly towards the LDP 
position on certain issues. Hence, they have been prepared to work with the 
government on occasion. Indeed, Diet procedures in general have gradually 
acquired a regularity and legitimacy enabling one to assert that parlia- 
mentarism has been institutionalized in Japan to the level of this institution in 
West Europe. Even the Japan Communist Party now resembles its West 
European counterparts in being w l h g  to work within the prevailing system. 
While that is also true of the Japanese Socialist Party (JSP), the JSP remains 
frozen in the past with its left wing strongly ideological and largely divorced 
from the main stream of its society. At this point, therefore, an alternation in 
power is difficult to envisage. 
If recent public opinion polls are used as a guide, however, Japanese 
citizens may be less firmly commited to the LDP as a party and to any given 
leader including Nakasone than is often assumed. Although a majority 
(nearly 52%) voted for LDP candidates in the July 1986 elections, a 
considerable smaller number regard themselves as committed to the LDP - 
31% according to a December 1986 poll. By the beginning of 1987, moreover, 
only about 39% of the electorate believed that the Nakasone administration 
was doing a good job, and several months earlier, a majority wanted 
Nakasone to step down after another year or less. It should be noted, 
however, that no other party garnered support close to the LDP. The 
Socialists, Japan's second party, fell to 18% in the 1986 national vote, and at 
the end of 1986, the JSP garnered only 8% public approval. Slightly over one- 
third of the Japanese electorate now claims that it supports no particular 
?arty, and it is this vote that might make some future difference, although 
given its present strength, the LDP appears safe through the early 1990s at 
least. 
It is clear that some of Nakasone's 1986 statements and actions eroded his 
popularity. The more intriguing question is whether Nakasone's political 
style, more individualistic and high-posture than that of any leader since 
Yoshida Shigeru, has captured the imagination of the Japanese citizenry. Or 
are most Japanese more comfortable with a less obtrusive, bureaucratic 
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leader? In any case, Nakasone's latter-day course was not consonant with 
public opinion. In recent polls, the Japanese public has given the highest 
ratings to price stabilization, tax reduction, and the improvement of social 
services - especially social security. There was far less interest in yen reevalu- 
ation and very little active support for increasing defence expenditures above 
1% of GNP. 
Such evidence as is available thus indicates that in raising Japan's posture 
in the world, Nakasone and other internationalists are ahead of Japanese 
public opinion - whether temporarily or in more fundamental terms remains 
to be seen, The data substantiate a fact commonly recognized. The impetus 
for change in Japanese policies relating to foreign relations is largely external. 
It does not stem from domestic sources. It is thus natural that Japanese 
leaders have had to exhibit caution in adjusting to foreign demands, 
especially since on some matters, they too harbor a reluctance to pursue risky 
alternatives. Consequently, the changes undertaken are never in time to 
obtain maximum political benefits. Indeed, when concessions are finally 
made, a new set of demands is already in the offing, and foreign judgment 
has been that Japan must be treated roughly to obtain results. 
Economic Strategy 
To probe more fully the source-springs of Japanese foreign policies, one 
must turn first to the structure and current status of the Japanese economy, 
and then explore select aspects of Japanese culture, particularly those aspects 
that bear upon the psychological attributes of mainstream Japahese. The 
broad outlines of Japanese economic strategy in the post-1945 era are 
sufficiently known to require only brief treatment here. Utilizing select 
aspects of its past, including nearly one hundred years' experience with 
industrialization, and taking advantage of the reforms and subsequent 
assistance provided by the United States, Japan aggressively pursued an 
export-oriented policy aimed at taking advantage of the favorable ratio 
between the prices of energy/idustrial materials and those of manufactured 
products. 
It was also aided by the prosperity of the advanced West, especially the 
United States, and the open markets afforded to it. Internally, a combination 
of universal literacy, an ample labor force, skilled management, and a 
harmonious, semi-paternalistic factory system conductive to industrial peace 
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were of signal benefit. As a part of their cultural heritage and reinforced by 
current necessity, moreover, the Japanese were attuned to adaptation. They 
had no need to be pioneers at this point, providing they could be aware of 
those ideas that had a future and could make them marketable. In addition to 
their skills, Japanese labor and management alike had a work ethic that 
rivalled that of any society, and a relatively spartan life-style enabling the 
Japanese savings ratio to soar above that of other industrial societies. These 
funds were available for industrial expansion. And such expansion not only 
gave rise to an entire new generation of large-scale high-tech industries, but 
also to a myriad of small and medium enterprises, draining off surplus labor 
from agriculture. 
These were the foundations upon which the so-called Japanese miracle 
arose. Today, there are some clouds on the horizon. At least for the present, 
Japanese overall growth hovers around 2.5%, and unemployment at 
approximately 3% is high measured against the recent Japanese record. 
Japan's major smokestack industries - steel, ship-building, and textiles - face 
the same type of competition from such Newly Industrializing Countries 
(NICs) as the United States and Europe have faced from Japan in recent 
decades. Perhaps the most serious problem, however, is the widespread 
criticism of Japan internationally as a nation oblivious to its responsibilities as 
a global economic power, continuing to sustain a largely closed market 
system at home while practicing unfair, predatory economic activities 
abroad. Retaliation in various forms is thus constantly threatened. 
Meanwhile, Japan has finally bowed to sustained American pressure and 
acquiesced in the rapid acceleration of the yen against the dollar in addition 
to engaging in further market-opening measures, especially in the financial 
sector. More sigruficant, however, has been the flood of Japanese investment 
abroad, and especially in the United States. It is Japanese funds that permit 
the United States to live above its means. With the rapid growth of 
interdependence between the United States and Japan, the politics as well as 
the economics of this bilateral relationship are being altered. Indeed, some 
observers are now using the term "integration" in speaking of the 
relationship of the two economies. 
What does the future hold? Experts differ in their assesment of the short-to 
medium-range prospects for the Japanese economy, but there are reasons to 
believe that despite problems, Japan will handle the difficult transitional era 
confronting all major industrial powers with more skill and success than 
most, if not all, others. Both government and the private sector know that the 
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premium must be upon high-tech and knowledge-intensive industries, with 
the service sector steadily rising in importance. This will place Japan in ever 
more intensive competition with the United States, a competition moderated 
in some degree by the interdependence just noted. To prepare for this battle, 
the Japanese assets are considerable. A very high savings ratio persists 
although various measures to encourge an expansion of the domestic market 
are under way. A huge trade surplus continues despite fiscal and market- 
opening measures. Japan's expenditures for research and development 
continue to rise, and are now second only to those of the Unites States. In 
certain fields, Japanese technology leads the field. Efforts to automate some 
traditional industries to improve their competitiveness, to shift others over- 
seas, and to phase out still others are taking place. Relatively uninhibited by 
stockholders, moreover, most Japanese industries are fighting to retain mar- 
ket-share, sacrificing high profits. And despite reports to the contrary, there 
are few indications that the Japanese work ethic is seriously declining. 
Complex issues do loom up. Foreign pressures upon Japan to change its 
economic strategy, even its culture, to permit more equitable economic 
relations will be unremitting. If results are not satisfactory, retaliatory 
meassures will follow. And from within Japan, demands are rising that 
measures be taken to improve the quality of life. Whatever the statistics may 
say about the collective wealth of Japan, the average Japanese does not feel 
rich - a fact powerfully conditioning his attitude towards the various sacrifices 
on behalf of international amity he is being asked to make. Housing in 
particular is a major problem, with the extraordinarily high price of land 
inhibiting resolution. Japan desperately needs land reform of a new type. 
The Japanese population is rapidly ageing, with the labor market destined 
to shrink in the years ahead. Among other things, this is certain to increase 
the demand for state-supported social services. Higher taxes, however 
unpalliative, seem inevitable. Indeed, all of these factors are already present 
on the Japanese political stage. Whatever remedial measures are taken, 
moreover, the competition from dynamic, still youthful societies moving into 
industrialization can only grow. Among them at some point will be China. 
One of the reasons why the Japanese are cautious in transferring technology 
to this giant is their concern about what is called the boomerang effect, 
namely that this technology will come back to Japan in the form of cheaply 
produced, high-quality goods. But this is a principle that will apply far more 
widely. 
Yet when all of the hazards are assessed, the odds favor a relatively 
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successful adjustment. The combination of continuing political stability, 
sound economic policies, a correct sense of problems, and the willingness - 
along with the capacity - to effect changes when required, together with a 
relatively good relation between government and the private sector, is likely 
to see Japan through the difficulties ahead. However, these factors will not 
necessarily make the commitment to genuine internationalism stronger. 
The Cultural Factor 
To appreciate additional facets bearing upon the latter consideration, let us 
turn to those elements that make up the Japanese collective personality and 
mind-set. Admittedly, this is a hazardous undertaking. The literature is filled 
with quackery and overly facile generalizations about Japanese attitudes and 
behavior, some of them advanced by Japanese. Cultural stereotypes are at 
best approximations, never wholly accurate nor universally applicable. Yet it 
seems correct to describe Japanese behavior in general as characteristic of the 
introverted individual most comfortable when operating within his primary 
reference group. Moreover, hierarchy is still a vital element within Japanese 
society, imbedded in language, family, and social relations at large. Thus, the 
concept of equality, whether in domestic or foreign relations, is a difficult 
principle to handle. In addition, racial homogeneity, a tradition of exclusive- 
ness, and the possession of a culture both unique and satisfymg in its major 
dimensions, combine to produce a strong racial consciousness. It is "we" 
versus "they", with racial stereotypes - hence, prejudices - strongly in evi- 
dence. In this respect, Japanese do not differ greatly from most other East 
Asians. 
In recent years, moreover, one can witness the reemergence of Japanese 
nationalism. At an earlier point, the trauma of total defeat in war brought out 
reflections upon Japan's leaders and institutions that were strongly negative. 
Feelings of inferiority and an accompanying pessimism were omnipresent in 
the initial postwar years. These sentiments supported accommodation to the 
reforms introduced by the American Occupation and also facilitated the 
acceptance of sacrifice on behalf of a brighter future. After decades of success, 
however, the Japanese mood is different. Younger generations are proud of 
being Japanese, relatively confident about their future, and unafraid to be 
compared with others. As they look abroad, they are prone to define much of 
Europe as decadent, the United States as a spoiled young adult threatening 
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his health with overindulgence, China as still incapable of putting its act 
together, and the Russians as the latest barbarians threatening their region. 
The noisy ultra-nationalists who seek a restoration of the past are a tiny 
minority and likely to remain so, but there is a new nationalism in Japan that 
must be factored into the political scene, present and future. 
Japan's International Role 
Against this background, one can understand why Japan, while having 
become an international economic power, has yet to develop truly inter- 
national attitudes and policies. This is not to say, however, that Japanese 
foreign policy has remained static. Partly as a result of the leadership of men 
like Nakasone, partly as a response to the prodding of the United States and 
other nations, partly as a product of those needs and opportunities that flow 
naturally from its phenomenal growth, Japan is moving toward expanded 
responsibilities and higher visibility in regional and international affairs. The 
domestic debate centers primarily upon the pace of these developments, and 
the precise mix of economic, political, and military commitments that should 
be undertaken. 
Perhaps the clearest evidence of Japan's rising posture is to be found in 
Northeast Asia. Here, we can see the emergence of a soft regionalism with 
Japan at its vortex. It is "soft" because it lacks a formal organizational 
structure, nor is it likely to have one in the foreseeable future for political 
reasons. But that makes it none the less important. The extraordinary growth 
of an economic network throughout the region, cutting across ideological- 
political lines, is its chief symbol, and in this trend Japan has played a critical 
role. Vital economic ties now exist between Japan and China, Japan and 
South Korea, and Japan and Taiwan, in addition to those between China and 
South Korea, and China and Taiwan. While North Korea tilts economically to 
the Soviet Union, as does Mongolia in even more decisive fashion, Japan has 
economic ties with both socialist states, bonds that may be of greater 
importance at some point in the future. 
Northeast Asian regionalism is not exclusively economic. High-level 
political visits have greatly expanded in recent years. Again, Tokyo has 
played a meaningful part, hosting Chinese and South Korean leaders, and 
reciprocating such visits. Less visible but continuing political connections 
with Taiwan and North Korea have been maintained semiofficially via Diet 
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"friendship committees". These ongoing contacts have enabled discussions 
of pressing political and security as well as economic problems relating to the 
region, with messages transmitted to relevant parties. 
Even in the security realm, Japan currently plays a regional role. In 
addition to acceptance of responsibility for sea and air surveillance to its east 
and south, and closer collaboration with the United States in joint military 
planning and exercises, activities related to contingencies beyond Japan 
proper, Japanese Self-Defense Force authorities have conferred with their 
Chinese and South Korean counterparts, both at home and overseas. While 
the Soviet charge that a Northeast Asian NATO is under way is a 
considerable exaggeration, low-level security ties are developing. Japan now 
probably has the fifth most significant military force in the world, measured 
in terms of the capacity of its weaponry although its thrust is wholly 
defensive, with the most limited offensive capacities. 
In all of Japan's regional activities, the United States remains a key element. 
U.S. economic relations with each of the regional states except North Korea 
are vital. Its political ties are also of importance, especially those with Japan 
and South Korea. In addition, its bilateral security agreements with these two 
nations, together with its role as a countervailing balance to the greatly 
augmented Soviet military presence in the region and its low-level security 
ties with both China and Taiwan constitute an irreplaceable factor in the 
regional security structure. 
The Soviet Union must also be accounted a regional force of importance. 
In addition to its military presence, Gorbachev's efforts to add economic and 
political increments to its Asian policies open up new vistas, both of oppor- 
tunity and threat. The superpowers are thus far from peripheral elements in 
the Northeast Asian scene. Yet Japan's position in the region had changed 
not merely in degree but in kind over the past several decades. 
There is also ample evidence to indicate that Japan has begun to exert a 
greater influence in southern Asia, using carefully circumscribed techniques. 
It is in the economic realm that Japan excels here, having become the leading 
trader and investor throughout much of the region. To travel in mral 
Thailand or Malaysia, for example, and to witness the plethora of Japanese 
transistor radios, television sets, motorcycles, and pickup trucks is to realize 
that the truly revolutionary agent in mral southeast Asia is Japan, not the 
Communists. Japanese economic assistance, official and private, is now a 
substantial element in the planning of most Southeast Asian states. Such aid, 
moreover, is political as well as economic in its implications. To provide 
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assistance to the Philippines or to withhold it from Vietnam represents a 
political act of major import. 
Using this reasoning, Japanese spokesmen have long asserted that they 
can make substantial contribution within the framework of comprehensive 
security, specializing in those economic actions that on the one hand bolster 
the stability of friendly developing states, and on the other hand deter 
aggresive behavior where it is in evidence. As with certain West Europeans, 
moreover, a number of Japanese argue that to draw various socialist states 
into the orbit of the market economies will be to induce complexities in their 
decision-making processes and enable a general reduction of tension, a view 
gradually shared by the United States in some degree. In any case, Japan 
advanced its economic role as a substitute for the type of military role 
unacceptable either to its own people or to other Asians. To economic 
policies, however, the Japanese government is willing, indeed eager, to add 
enhanced cultural interaction. Southern Asians are brought to Japan in 
increasing numbers for training, and in turn, various forms of Japanese 
culture are transmitted to the region. 
Viewing recent trends, some observers have remarked that Japan has at 
last achieved the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere that was its earlier 
objective, and done so without the costs previously attached, There are some 
parallels, but the analogy is basically misleading. The Japanese crusade which 
opened in the 1930s aimed to drive the West out of Asia in every respect, 
making the region an exclusive Japanese sphere of influence. Today, Japah is 
indeed a formidable economic competitor with the West throughout the 
region, but if its interests are to be served, it must have the political-strategic 
cooperation of the West, and especially of the United States. It cannot take up 
a commanding political or security position even if it desired to do so. The 
rest of Asia as well as Japan has changed. There is no Western imperialism to 
overthrow, no vacuum of power to fill. On the contrary, only with an 
American strategic presence can Japan pursue its economic interests with 
confidence. 
While Japanese policies toward the Third World are focussed primarily 
upon the Asian theater, Japan's global economic reach dictates worldwide 
operations, in some cases with political as well as economic purpose in mind. 
Assistance to Egypt and Turkey are cases in point, as was the abortive effort 
to influence Iran. Japanese interest in the Middle East is natural, given its 
heavy dependence upon oil from this area. Activities in Africa and Latin 
America are more strictly economic in scope. 
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Economic factors have caused Japan to devote more time to its relations 
with West Europe, but essentially, it views these relations as part of its general 
interaction with the advanced industrial world headed by United States. It is 
with the three states that bear most directly upon Japan's economic, political, 
and security interest to which greatest attention must be given - namely, the 
United States, the Soviet Union, and China. It is appropriate, therefore, that 
we turn finally to these bilateral relations as well as to the linkages that in 
some measure connect them. 
Japan - U.S. Relations 
The Japan-U.S. alliance is the single most important bilateral relation held by 
either nation today. While the marriage has been and will continue to be 
stormy, there will be no divorce. The combination of economic interdepen- 
dence and strategic dependence will serve to make a dissolution of the ties 
impossible. At the same time, since the current economic problems are 
systemic as well as policy-derived, no sudden solutions can be envisaged. For 
both societies, structural changes are essential if economic health is to be 
preserved or attained. For the United States, serious attention must also be 
given to fiscal and budgetary policies, with the recognition that the status of 
the American economy will affect relations with many nations, including 
Japan. 
At this writing, it appears that such protectionism as is applied by the 
United States will be hinged to the economic policies of individual countries 
and the status of their interaction with the United States. Administrative 
discretion will probably be considerable. Fairness and reciprocity will 
continue to be the code words. Meanwhile, various efforts to ameliorate 
grievances are under way in Japan, as noted earlier, and American authorities 
have belatedly acknowledged the need to face up to budgetary deficits and 
insufficient revenues, albeit with limited success thus far. 
On the political and security fronts, Japan's relation with the United States 
are more harmonious than at any time since the alliance was fashioned. 
Where political disagreements exist, as with respect to Middle East policies, 
discretion on the part of Japan is observed. In general, however, Japan and 
the United States have a similar list of political desiderata. Meanwhile, Japan 
has moved with some increase in tempo to accede to American requests that 
it do more on behalf of its own defence. Even now, the United States has not 
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made it completely clear as to what it wishes Japan to do in the course of the 
next decade, but coordinated defence planning and exercises have advanced, 
Japan has agreed to participate in SDI and crept over the 1% barrier, and 
Prime Minister Nakasone has spoken out more forcibly on Japan's 
obligations as a security partner than any of his predecessors. 
Undoubtedly, the future of Japan-U.S. relations will be marked by an 
intricate mix of competition and cooperation. Current tension, particularly in 
the United States, runs high, and incidents like the sales of proscribed items 
by a Toshiba subsidiary to the Soviet Union add fuel to the fire. If we assume 
that these two nations, and the world, can avoid serious, sustained economic 
reverses, however, the American-Japanese relationship will survive the 
present crisis. In its competitive as well as its cooperative aspects, moreover, 
it will force economic reforms in each society even as it contributes to the 
growth and security of the Pacific-Asian region. 
Relations Between Japan and the Soviet Union 
Relations between Japan and the Soviet Union have followed a very different 
course, and dramatic change is not in the offing. It is well to remember that 
Japan and Rusia have fought two declared wars and engaged in a series of 
undeclared conflicts in the course of this century. Theirs has been a history of 
almost unalleviated hostility and mistrust from earliest contacts, and the 
memory of this history is deeply etched into the consciousness of both 
people. As the younger generation would put it, the vibes are not good. 
Beyond this, there are few factors on the immediate horizon that would 
support major improvements at this point in time. Economically, to be sure, 
meaningful interaction can be envisaged. Japan could play a major role in the 
development of Siberia, and indeed, in the modernization of other parts of 
the USSR. In exchange, it could utilize some of the energy sources, industrial 
materials, and food products, especially marine products, of the USSR. 
Depending upon the outcome of the economic reforms now being 
attempted by Gorbachev, this may come to pass at some future time. For the 
near future, however, technical as well as strategic considerations block the 
path. As Japan moves in new economic directions, its need for Soviet raw 
materials is declining. The Soviet capacity to pay for Japanese assistance is 
correspondingly affected. If economic intercourse is to increase significantly 
in the years ahead, moreover, it must be encased in a new environment. At 
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present, the USSR is rightly regarded by Japan as the primary security threat. 
While the Japanese do not fear a Soviet invasion, they are aware of the fact 
that Soviet power in overwhelming guantity now rests on their doorstep. 
The Russians in turn view Japan as a forward American base, harboring the 
military capacity to bottle up the Soviet Far Eastern fleet and eliminate key 
Siberian air bases if not countered. In every sense, Japan is a front-line state. 
Thus, they have limited incentive to make concessions on the Northern 
islands, although this possibility will unquestionably continue to be 
considered. 
In part, the future of Japan-USSR relations will hinge upon trends with 
respect to relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. If the 
latter relations improve, and tension is reduced globally, with sizeable reduc- 
tions in arms, conditions will have been prepared for a new era in Japanese 
relations with their northern neighbor. Even under these conditions, how- 
ever, normalization is likely to be approached with wariness and restraint on 
both sides. 
Relations Between Japan and China 
Relations between Japan and China present a more promising prospect. 
When Deng Xiaoping spoke of these relations a few years ago, he remarked 
that they were the best in this century. That is not saying a great deal, since 
Japan's relations with China have been almost as conflictual in the past 
century as those with Russia. However, they have been a great deal more 
intimate at times, with strands of cooperation as well as hostility. As the 
century comes to a close, Japan fully expects to be the principal vehicle for 
China's modernization in the decades ahead. In a variety of ways, both the 
Japanese government and private sector are preparing for that task. Now and 
for the foreseeable future, moreover, there are few political or security 
obstacles. While their political systems and stages of development are 
radically different, Japan, unlike the United States, has no emotional need to 
conduct missionary work on behalf of democratization. Unless the Chinese 
political environment produces the type of instability that would be harmful 
to Japanese economic activities, the Japanese will not concern themselves 
overly with Chinese political trends. And from the Chinese viewpoint, Japan 
is not likely to be a security threat. 
None of these facts point to Pan-Asianism of the type that certain Japanese 
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and Chinese envisaged during the early years of this century. That concept is 
pass6 if indeed it ever had meaning. In addition to the factors mentioned 
earlier, certain reservations are presently harbored by both Japan and China 
about each other, reservations not likely to disappear. Indeed, in the recent 
past, Sino-Japanse relations have cooled somewhat. Many Japanese remain 
uncertain about the result of China's modernization efforts. Thus, the private 
sector has drawn back from investment in China. On the other side of the 
coin, virtually all Japanese are alert to the competitive potential of China in 
the economic sphere and, beyond this, to the potent force of Chinese 
nationalism which, if harnessed to power, military as well as economic, could 
exert enormous pressures throughout the region. Thus, Japan wants China 
to make progress - slowly. 
The Chinese have their own reservations. While they are not as deeply 
worried about Japan's remilitarization or the signs of a resurgent nationalism 
as their rhetoric sometimes suggests, they do have concerns - as witness - the 
alacrity with which they attacked Nakasone's visit to the Yasukuni Shrine and 
revisionist textbooks produced in Japan in relating to wartime events. There 
is a resentment, moreover, of Japanese economic aggressiveness and what is 
perceived on occasion to be Japanese sharp dealing in the economic sphere. 
Thus China hopes to keep economic intercourse with Japan within certain 
bounds despite its very considerable needs. Moreover, they are very irritated 
at Japan's continuing strong ties with Taiwan, including extensive Japanese 
investments there, and a network of unofficial political ties. As in the case of 
the United States, Japan is following a de facto one-China, one-Taiwan policy 
in China's view. 
Conclusion 
In surveying Japanese relations with the major states, one is made aware of a 
seeming paradox. Japan is in the process of expanding its foreign relations, 
reluctantly preparing for increased costs and risks, at a time when other 
nations are seeking to reduce the costs and risks of their foreign policies to 
concentrate more substantially upon pressing domestic problems. In con- 
siderable part, Japan's contrary trend relates to the position from whence it is 
coming in comparison with others, as well as to the pace and dimension of its 
recent growth in power, hence influence. Nevertheless, it is yet another 
factor conducive to deep soul-searching on the part of the Japanese leaders 
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and the public, as they ponder the appropriate role for their society in a 
profoundly revolutionary era. 
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